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A bstract
We consider a model with a single principal and two agents 
and compare the payoff to the principal when agents choose 
their actions simultaneously and when they choose them se­
quentially. We show that when the actions are strategic com­
plements, the principal is typically better off when moves are 
sequential. In particular examples, however, the principal may 
be worse off.
*We are grateful to Paul Klemperer, Meg Meyer, James Mirrlees and seminar 






















































































































































































The problem of designing optimal incentive schemes when there is a single 
principal and many agents has been studied extensively in the literature 
(see for example, Holmstrom (1982) and Mookherjee (1984) in the context 
of moral hazard and Demski and Sappington (1984) in the case of adverse 
selection). The agents are, however, almost always assumed to choose their 
actions simultaneously. Yet in many situations agents may well have an 
idea of what other agents have done. For example in a production line, 
workers may be able to observe how hard workers at a previous stage have 
worked and will choose their own effort levels accordingly. This paper seeks 
to analyse how the principal’s problem is altered when agents are able to 
condition their actions on the choices of other agents. In particular, we ask 
whether the principal is better off if agents move sequentially.
In some cases the principal may be able to determine the order of moves. 
In other cases the order may be determined by technology. For example, 
the order of car assembly is largely determined by physical and inventory 
considerations. On the other hand, the degree of information passed on 
from one stage to another may be under the control of the Principal. No 
information passed on corresponds to simultaneous moves, full information 
to sequential moves and so our model can still be applied. For example, 
suppose that a car needs both a high quality chassis and a high quality en­
gine in order to be acceptable. In this case quality in the engine and chassis 
are strategic complements in the sense of Bulow, Geanakoplos and Klem­
perer (1985): more effort by one party raises the incentive for the other 
party to work hard. Our analysis suggests that it is better that workers at 
the engine stage have information on the degree of quality control at the 
chassis stage passed on to them.
On the other hand, when sending out a typescript for proof-reading, is 
it better to circulate the same copy to proof-readers in sequence or to send 
each proof-reader a copy and consolidate their comments? Since proof­
reading qualities of different readers are strategic substitutes, that is more 
effort by one reader reduces the returns to increased effort by the other 




























































































In general, our analysis suggests that it is generally better to proceed se­
quentially when the parties’ actions are strategic complements, as perhaps 
they are in the first example, but not if they are strategic substitutes, as 
in the second example.
This work builds on an earlier paper by us (Banerjee and Beggs (1989)). 
In that paper we analysed a simple model with two agents where the first 
had no direct impact on output but affected the marginal costs of the 
second. With simultaneous moves, the principal was unable to induce any 
effort by the first agent since the latter’s actions had no effect on output. 
With sequential moves, however, if the distribution of output had shifting 
support, the principal could implement the first-best. Here if the first 
agent deviated the second would also deviate, as his marginal costs would 
change, and this would enable the principal to punish the first agent. This 
technological structure is clearly rather special and in this paper we seek to 
compare in a more general setting the principal’s welfare under sequential 
moves with his welfare under simultaneous moves.
We assume that there are two agents both of whose actions have an 
impact on output. The support of output is assumed fixed. We assume that 
under sequential moves the second agent observes, with a given probability, 
the effort level chosen by the first agent. We show that, in general it is 
less costly for the principal to implement an action pair under sequential 
than simultaneous moves if the agents’ actions are strategic complements. 
Intuitively, if the agents’ actions are strategic complements, the second 
agent upon realising that the first agent has slacked will also do so. Under 
sequential moves, output is therefore more sensitive to the first agent’s 
actions and the incentive problem is therefore reduced.
It is, however, possible for the principal to be worse off under sequential 
moves even if the agents’ actions are strategic complements and we give an 
example of this. We give sufficient conditions for this not to be the case. 
These are equivalent to the usual (sufficient) conditions which ensure that 
it is only the constraints that the agent not wish to work less hard which
'In practice of course another consideration to be offset against any gains from sequen­




























































































are binding in the sequential game.
The above logic is reversed if the agents’ actions are strategic substitutes: 
now the second agent will tend to compensate for slack by the first agent. 
The principal will therefore prefer simultaneous moves.
In some examples, as noted above, the move order may be determined 
by physical constraints or at least very costly for the principal to alter. An 
alternative interpretation of our results is to think of the move order as fixed 
but with the principal determining the probability with which the second 
agent observes the first agent’s action. We show that that it is always 
better for the principal for the second agent to have a small probability 
of observing the first agent’s action than to have no such chance (which 
is equivalent to agents moving simultaneously). For the reasons outlined 
above, however, the principal may be worse off if this probability is large.
Demski and Sappington (1984) and Sappington and Demski (1983) study 
a model where two agents simultaneously take observable actions but have 
private information. If the information of the agents is correlated then 
the principal can use the actions of one agent to make inferences about 
the information of the other agent and designs incentives accordingly. Our 
model is one of moral hazard rather than adverse selection but is similar 
in spirit in that with sequential moves the agent who moves second has 
information about the actions of the first agent.
It should be noted that our work is distinct from that on monitoring 
in agencies. In those models, the supervisor has no productive role but 
may observe the output of the worker (see for example Tirole (1990) for a 
survey of this work). In our model, both agents have a productive role and 
the monitoring occurs implicitly, via the action choice of the second agent. 
That is we focus on the gains from sequential production in a model where 
there is no cheap talk and all the agents’ actions have productive implica­
tions. Hence our analysis complements papers in the literature which focus 
on the monitoring aspects of hierarchies and provides reasons for organis­
ing production sequentially, even in the absence of explicit monitoring and 
reporting mechanisms.
Section 2 sets out the model. Section 3 presents out main results. Section 




























































































2 The M odel
There is a single risk-neutral principal who wishes to maximise his expected 
revenue net of payments to the agents. There are two agents, 1 and 2. 
Agent 1 can take a finite number of actions a\ < ... <  and agent 2 can 
take actions (3\ < ... < (3i . The actions may be thought of as effort levels. 
There are n possible outcomes with monetary value X\ < ... < xs < ... < xn 
to the principal. If the agents take actions a  and (3 respectively then the 
probability of outcome s occurring is ps(a, 0). The principal cannot observe 
the actions taken by the agents.
Agent 1 has utility function Ul(I l) — a, where 71 is the monetary pay­
ment made by the principal and a  is the action taken by agent 1. Similarly 
Agent 2 has utility function U2(I2) — (3. Given the (standard) assumption 
of additive separability of utility in income and effort, the assumption that 
the cost of effort is linear in effort is made without loss of generality as one 
can always choose non-linear units so that this is true. We will allow there 
to be a lower limit, J, (which may be minus infinity), to the payments that 
can be made to an agent, but will assume that income falling to this level 
yields him arbitrarily low utility, so that we do not need to worry about 
bankruptcy constraints binding (this assumption is commonly made, see 
for example Grossman and Hart (1983)). Apart from this, the following 
assumptions are standard and require no comment:
A ssum ption  1 Ul is continuous, strictly increasing and strictly concave 
and U '(I) tends to minus infinity as I tends to * =  1,2.
A ssum ption  2 Agents 1 and 2 have reservation utilities t/j and U_2 re­
spectively.
We will also assume
A ssum ption  3 Ŷ =kPs(a< 0) increasing in a  and (3 for each k.
This simply says that working harder raises the probability of higher out­
comes in the sense of first-order stochastic dominance. Again, this seems 
innocuous.
Assumptions 1-3 will be in force throughout the analysis. We will also 




























































































A ssum ption  4 (£ ? =t{?»(“ «+!./?)-p (a ,-,/? )})/(a i+i — cq) is decreasing in 
i for all k and similarly for agent 2.
A ssum ption  5 ps(a', /3)/ps(a, (3) is increasing in s fo r a 1 > a  and ps(a, (J')/pa(a, /3 
is increasing in s for /?' > /?.
These are standard sufficient conditions for the optimal payment scheme 
to be increasing in output and no upwards constraints to be binding2 in 
the simultaneous case. The first condition essentially states that the cumu­
lative distribution function of output is a convex function of each agent’s 
effort. The second says that high output is relatively more likely to be 
observed if effort is high. This implies Assumption 3. With two outcomes 
it is in fact equivalent to Assumption 3 but is in general stronger than 
it. Both these conditions are standard, though strong, conditions (see, for 
example, Grossman and Hart (1983)).
In the first case we consider, the agents choose their actions simultane­
ously. The principal can offer the agents payments I l {x) and I 2(x) con­
ditional on the level of output x. If both agents accept these contracts 
they then choose which actions to take. If either rejects, they receive their 
reservation utilities. It will be assumed that the actions the agents take 
form a Nash equilibrium. If there is more than one Nash equilibrium for 
the given incentive scheme then we will initially assume that the prin­
cipal can choose which equilibrium the agents play. It may be the case 
(see Mookherjee (1984)) that the optimal incentive scheme has multiple 
equilibria, one of which the agents prefer but is worse for the principal.
In Section 4 we consider the implications of imposing the restriction that 
an action pair can only be implemented by an incentive scheme if there 
is no other equilibrium which both agents strictly prefer. We show that 
this restriction does not affect our basic comparison between simultaneous 
and sequential move structures. The principal’s objective is to choose the 
incentive schemes and actions taken to maximise his expected profit.
In the second case we consider, there is a probability q(>  0) that the 
second agent observes which action the first has taken. In this case, the
'That is one can neglect the constraints that the agents should not wish to work harder 




























































































second agent is assumed to take a best response to the first agent’s action. 
If he does not observe the action taken, he believes that the first agent has 
taken his equilibrium action. As before, the principal proposes incentive 
schemes and if these are accepted the agents choose actions. We assume 
that these form a sub-game perfect equilibrium and that if there are several 
equilibria, the principal can choose which one they play. As before, the 
principal’s aim is to maximise his expected payoff.
This monitoring technology is rather crude in that the second agent 
either observes perfectly the first agent’s actions or observes nothing. A 
more sophisticated approach would allow different signals to be received 
depending on the actions taken. This would, however, be substantially 
more complicated as one would have to specify what beliefs the agent 
should have about which action had been taken if he received a signal 
that cannot occur in equilibrium (a signal that is compatible with the 
equilibrium action must lead to the belief that the equilibrium action has 
been taken with probability one). The issue of what constitute reasonable 
beliefs would involve refinements of sequential equilibrium and would take 
us away from our main interests.
Note that q is assumed to be independent of the actions taken. One 
interpretation would be that there is a given probability that agent l ’s work 
is inspected and the results passed on to agent 2 (but not to the principal). 
For most of our analysis the reader will not lose much by taking q to be 
one (perfect observability).
3 R esults
In this section, we present our principal results. Section 3.1 presents our 
main result on when it is cheaper to implement an action pair with se­
quential moves. Section 3.2 looks at the special case of two outcomes, for 
which one can obtain slightly stronger results. Section 3.3 discusses the 
case when the intensity of monitoring can be varied. Section 3.4 exam­





























































































3.1 The Main Result
In this sub-section we present our main result on when it is cheaper to 
implement an action pair with sequential moves. The key assumption for 
our analysis is
A ssu m p tion  6 (£)" t {ps(a', (3) -  ps(a ,(3 )})/(a ' — a) is increasing in (3 if 
a' > a  for all k. Similarly for player 2.
In words this assumption says that the harder agent 2 works, an increase 
in effort by agent 1 produces a greater increase in the probability of higher 
outcomes for the same increase in cost. It implies that, provided an agent 
is paid more for high output, an agent will work harder the harder the 
other agent works, i.e. the agents’ actions are strategic complements in 
the sense of Bulow, Geanakoplos and Klemperer (1985) (see also Vives 
(1990) and Milgrom and Roberts (1990) for further discussion of strategic 
complementarities).
We will also consider the implication of the opposite assumption, that 
the actions are strategic substitutes, so that the harder one agent works, 
the less hard the other wishes to work:
A ssu m p tion  7 {J2"=l,{Ps{a '> ft) — /3)})/(«' — a) is decreasing in/3 if
a' > a  for all k. Similarly for player 2.
In order to analyse the problem we will find it convenient to follow Gross- 
man and Hart (1983)’s approach to the principal-agent problem. That is, 
for every pair of actions we will compute the least cost means (if any) of 
implementing them. To this end, it is more convenient to think of the prin­
cipal choosing utilities to pay the agents if certain outcomes are revealed 
and inverting these to find the equivalent monetary payments, rather than 
working with money directly. Let V l{u) be the inverse of agent i's utility 
function. Let E U 1(a,/3) =  Ps(a , ft)ul ~  a  denote the expected utility 
obtained by agent 1 if he takes action a  and agent 2 takes action (3 and the 
payment scheme from the principal gives utility u] in state i to the agent. 
For convenience explicit reference to the payment scheme is suppressed. 




























































































mum cost if actions are chosen simultaneously the principal 
following program:
must solve the
( P I )
! 2X l ^ ( Q>/3)[P 1(U‘) +  P 2(Us)]
s.t.
E U \ a ,0 ) > U } (PCI)
EU2(a ,0 )  > U 2 (PC2)
E U \ a ,0 ) > E U \ a ' , 0 )  Va' (IC1)
EU2{ a ,0 ) > E U 2(a ,0 ')  V/3' (IC2)
(PCI) and (PC2) are the participation constraints and guarantee that 
each agent receives at least his reservation utility. (IC1) and (IC2) are the 
incentive constraints and simply require that (a, 0) forms a Nash equilib­
rium. If the constraints cannot be satisfied then that particular action pair 
cannot be implemented.
When the two agents take their actions sequentially, the principal must 
take into account the fact that the second agent can condition his action on 
the first agent’s, if he observes it. Instead of a single action the principal 
can now specify a reaction function, R(-), for agent 2. To implement the 
pair (a, 0) at minimum cost the principal must solve the problem:
(P2)
min $2p.(a,/3)[V '1(uJ) +  P 2(u*)]
S.t.
R(a) =  0
E U 1(a ,0 )  >  U_y (PCI)
EU 2(a, 0) >  U_2 (PC2)
a  € argmaxQf qEUl (a', f?(a')) +  (1 -  q)EU 1(a',0 )
(ICT)




























































































The first condition simply requires that R specifies that 0  be chosen by 
agent 2 in response to a. (PCI) and (PC2) are unchanged from before. 
The new incentive constraint (ICl') reflects the fact that with probability 
q the second agent will observe the action taken by the first agent and 
will take response R(a') to it, while with probability 1 — q he will observe 
nothing, believe that the first agent has not deviated, and take action 0. 
(IC2') requires that R(.) specify a best response for the second agent to 
every possible action by the first agent, that is there is a sub-game perfect 
equilibrium.
To see why this sequential move structure may be better for the principal, 
consider the optimal responses of agent 2 to agent l ’s actions. If agent 1 
works less hard, then under sequential moves agent 2 may observe this 
and, if Assumption 6 holds, has an incentive to work less hard himself. 
As a result, the outcome is worse than under simultaneous moves when 
only agent 1 deviates. The incentive for agent 1 to deviate is therefore less 
under sequential moves.
For our main result we need some preliminary lemmas. By upwards 
constraints for, say, agent 1 we mean incentive constraints of the form 
‘a, is preferred to a l+}, j  > O’, i.e. agent 1 prefer not to work harder. 
Downwards constraints are of the same form with j  < 0, that is agent 1 
prefer not to work less hard.
Lem m a 1 If Assumptions \  and 5 hold for agent j ,  then the optimal pay­
ment scheme under simultaneous moves has payment increasing with effort 
(vPs is increasing with s)  and no upwards constraints bind.
In the case of sequential moves, it is harder to find clean sufficient condi­
tions for the upwards constraints not to bind because the probability that 
a given outcome occurs depends on the reaction function of the second 
agent, R(-). In the case of continuous actions it is possible to find some 
rather ugly primitive conditions in terms of third derivatives guaranteeing 
Assumption 8.3 These are however not very informative and we prefer to 
make the following direct assumption: 3




























































































A ssum ption  8 Assumptions f  and 5 hold with ps(a ,0 )  replaced by (1 — 
q)ps{a, 0) +  qps(a, R (a)), all s, for player 1.
This directly implies
Lem m a 2 Under Assumption 8, no upwards constraints are binding under 
sequential moves.
Lem m a 3 If Assumption 6 holds for agent 2 and his optimal payment 
scheme is increasing (u2s is increasing in s), then R(.) can be chosen to be 
increasing in s.
Proof: See appendix
Note that optimal reactions need not be unique, hence the qualification 
‘can be chosen’.
P roposition  1 Let (a, 0) be an action pair implementable under simulta­
neous moves. Provided Lemmas 1 to 3 hold, then (a, 0) can be implemented 
more cheaply under sequential moves if agent 1 moves first and agent 2 is 
given the same payment scheme as is optimal under simultaneous moves.
Proof See Appendix
The intuition for this result is that outlined above. Since agent 2’s 
reaction function is increasing, agent 1 will obtain lower payoffs if he works 
less hard under sequential moves (by Lemma 1) than simultaneous moves. 
This therefore relaxes all downwards constraints on agent 1. By Lemmas 
1 and 2, the upwards constraints do not bind in either problem so the 
constraints on agent 1 have been relaxed and those on agent 2 are the 
same, hence the principal is better off.
Rem ark 1 It should be noted that Assumptions 4, 5 and 8 are only used 
in the proofs of Lemmas 1 and 2. Proposition 1 would therefore continue to 
hold if they were replaced by other, possibly weaker, assumptions provided 
Lemmas 1 and 2 continue to hold, that is the payment scheme is increasing 
under simultaneous moves and no upwards constraints are binding in either 
problem. Assumption 6, however, is pivotal for our analysis.
R em ark 2 The conditions given above are only sufficient for sequential 




























































































better by changing agent 2 ’s payoffs. When there are two outcomes, this 
is not the case: in the next sub-section we show that there it is optimal 
to give agent 2 the same payoffs under sequential moves. Furthermore in 
Section 4.1, we give an example where even though Assumption 6 holds, 
the principal is worse off because Assumption 8 fails to hold and upwards 
constraints become binding.
3.2 The Case of Two Outcomes
The analysis above can be illustrated in the case of two outcomes. In fact 
one can obtain a tighter result than in the general case. Namely, we will 
show that if an outcome can be implemented under both sequential and 
simultaneous moves it can be implemented more cheaply under sequential 
moves.
We label the two outcomes L and H  rather than 1 and 2 for convenience 
and let p { a ,0 ) be the probability of outcome H.
P rop osition  2 Under Assumption 6 if an outcome can be implemented 
under both simultaneous moves and sequential moves, it can be implemented 
more cheaply under sequential moves.
Proof: See Appendix.
This can be understood by considering Figure 1. Suppose agent 1 has 
three actions ot\, c*2 and 03 and agent 2 has actions 0\ to 03. Suppose 
that the prinicipal wishes to implement the action pair (a^,/^)- With 
simultaneous moves, the utility pairs (u\ , u2H) lying on or above the line 
PCI satisfy the participation constraint. In order that he prefer oci to c*i, 
the utility pair must lie above the line «2 ~  c*2- In order that he prefer 
02 to 03, the utility pair must lie below the line 02 ~  03. Note that in 
the two-outcome case, only the difference ulH — u \ affects the incentive 
constraints and so Oi ~  02 and 02 ~  03 are parallel lines. Assumption 4 
guarantees that 02 ~  03 lies above o i ~  02, so the problem is feasible and 
the optimal choice for the principal is to give the agent as close to perfect 
insurance (the points on the 45° line) as possible, that is at the intersection 
of PCI and 01 ~  02, that is the downwards incentive constraint binds and 




























































































With simultaneous moves, agent 1 takes agent 2’s action 02 as given. 
With sequential moves, however, agent 2 may respond to decreased effort 
by working less hard himself. As a result, ulH — u \ can be lowered to 
induce a given amount of effort. Both incentive constraints are therefore 
lower (and (PCI) is unchanged). Provided that Qi ~  c*2 continues to lie 
below c*2 ~  «3, that is the upwards and downwards incentive constraints 
are compatible, (c ^ A )  can still be implemented. Since the intersection of 
PCI and « i ~  c*2 is closer to the 45° line the principal is better off as he 
can offer better insurance.
It follows that in the two-outcome case, the upwards and downwards 
constraints are only compatible if the upwards constraints do not bind, 
hence the stronger result. This need not however be true with more than 
two outcomes.
As part of the proof of Proposition 2, it is shown that
Lem m a 4 The optimal payments to agent 2 to implement a given action 
pair are the same with simultaneous and sequential moves.
Proof: See Appendix.
The reason for this is that in the simultaneous game, the difference 
between agent two’s payments in two outcomes u2H — u \ is chosen as small 
as possible as is consistent with making 0  a best response to a, so this 
cannot be lowered.4 Raising u2H — u \ simply makes upward deviation in 
response to more effort from agent 1 more attractive and so simply tightens 
his upwards constraint.
This is perhaps a somewhat surprising result as one might expect the 
principal to choose agent 2’s payments to make maximum use of his ability 
to monitor agent 1. It turns out that, in the two-outcome case, the optimal 
simultaneous payments are also optimal for inducing monitoring.
3.3 M onitoring Intensity
So far we have emphasised the comparison between pure simultaneous and 
pure sequential moves. In some examples, it may be more plausible to
''Note that only the difference u2H — u \ affects the incentive constraints. The level of 




























































































think of the move order as determined by physical considerations but the 
principal may be able to influence the probability that the second agent is 
able to observe the first agent’s action (q). In this case, a small amount 
of monitoring by the second agent will always benefit the principal. If q 
is small (but positive) then agent l ’s upwards constraints will still not be 
binding under sequential moves if they do not bind under simultaneous 
moves, hence
P rop osition  3 For small enough q, an action pair can be implemented 
more cheaply with sequential moves if no upwards constraint for agent 1 is 
binding with simultaneous moves (and Lemma 3 holds).
On the other hand if q is large, this may not hold so too much knowledge 
may be a dangerous thing.
3.4 Strategic Substitutes
In the case of strategic substitutes, the analysis above is reversed. Under 
strategic substitutes, if agent 1 works less hard then agent 2 to some extent 
compensates by working harder, so slacking is more attractive for agent 2. 
One therefore has (proof in Appendix)
P rop osition  4 Let (a, (3) be an action pair implementable under simulta­
neous moves. Assume that
a. Agent 2 ’s reaction function R(.) cannot be chosen to be increasing when 
given his optimal simultaneous move payoffs.
b. The optimal payment scheme for agent 1 is increasing under simulta­
neous and sequential moves (that is u] is increasing in s)
c. No upwards constraints are binding under simultaneous moves for agent
1 .
Then it is more expensive to implement (a, /?) under sequential moves if 
agent 1 moves first and agent 2 is given the same payment scheme as is 
optimal under sequential moves.
Note that a sufficient condition for (a) is (proof in Appendix)5




























































































Lem m a 5 If Assumption 7 holds strictly and agent 2 ’s optimal payment 
scheme is increasing under simultaneous moves, then R(.) cannot be chosen 
to be increasing.
The phrase ‘Assumption 7 holds strictly’ means that the ratio in As­
sumption 7 is strictly increasing. This is simply used to deal with the 
problem of multiple best responses. The intuition is clear: working less 
hard is now more attractive and so by (c), this tightens a binding con­
straint, so the principal is worse off. 6,7
4 D iscussion
This discusses briefly some further issues in our model.
4.1 Counter-Example
So far we have simply examined the costs of implementing an arbitrary 
action pair. Even if the optimal simultaneous action pair cannot be im­
plemented with sequential moves, it is possible that the optimal sequential 
pair yields a higher payoff to the principal. We therefore now present an 
example in which the principal is strictly worse off with sequential moves 
no matter which agent moves first.
Each agent has four actions. There are two outcomes. The probabilities 
of the high outcome occurring are shown in the matrix in Figure 2. Agent 
1 chooses the row, agent 2 the column. The costs of choosing the actions 
are are 0,1,2.2 and 2.32 for agent 1 and 0,1,2.16 and 2.35 for agent 2. We 
assume that 9 = 1 .  It is straightforward to check that Assumptions 1-6, 
are satisfied.
We assume that both agents are risk-neutral. This violates Assumption 
1 but it is easy to see that the counter-example remains valid if the utility 67
6In this case, it does not matter whether the upwards constraints bind under sequential 
moves.
7Note that if Assumptions 4 and 5 hold standard arguments, see for example Grossman 
and Hart (1983), show that any action pair is implementable with simultaneous moves, 




























































































functions are made slightly concave. The advantage of working with risk- 
neutral agents is that is possible to solve the principal’s problem very easily.
Under the above assumptions, any action pair can be implemented under 
simultaneous moves. Moreover this can be done at first-best cost: since 
agents only care about their expected payments, moving them away from 
the 45° line to give them incentives to choose the correct actions imposes 
no distortion. It is easy to check that if 6 | < xh — %l <  6.675 then the 
unique first-best pair is (1,1).
If we can show that (1,1) cannot be implemented under sequential moves 
regardless of which agent moves first, then the principal must be worse off, 
since (1,1) is the first-best point and therefore whatever else he implements 
must be worse. This is indeed the case.
In order to show that (1,1) cannot be implemented with sequential moves 
it must be shown that the incentive constraints of whichever agent moves 
first cannot be satisfied. This is straightforward and the details are omit­
ted. The key observation is to use Lemma 4, which shows that it may be 
assumed that whichever player moves second is given the lowest payoffs 
that make action 1 a best response to action 1.
Note finally that in the simultaneous game with payment levels uxH — uxL =  
— u \ =  5, the only equilibria are (1,1) and (0,0) and so (1,1) is indeed 
the Pareto dominant equilibrium for the agents. The considerations of the 
next sub-section therefore do not arise.
4.2 Uniqueness of Equilibrium
One potential caveat to our results is that they ignore the possibility of 
multiple equilibria. If there are multiple equilibria and the agents strictly 
prefer one equilibrium to the one the principal prefers, then one might 
argue that they will choose the former and so the characterisation of im- 
plementability is incomplete. Nevertheless, we will show that Proposition 
1 remains valid even when one imposes the requirement that the agents 
not play an equilibrium that is strictly Pareto-dominated.
In fact, provided neither agent is taking their least-cost actions, the op­




























































































the agents actions are strategic complements.8 In particular, if (a, /3) is the 
desired action pair, then there is always an equilibrium in which both play­
ers take lower actions.9 Nevertheless, this does not seem problematic as 
(a, P) Pareto dominates any lower equilibrium.10 It seems natural there­
fore to suppose that the agents will coordinate on the Pareto dominant 
equilibrium.
There is no guarantee, however, that there are not equilibria of the si­
multaneous game in which both players work harder than (a, ft). It follows 
from Milgrom and Roberts (1990)11 that the game between the agents has 
a largest equilibrium, in the sense that each player’s action is as high as 
his action in any other equilibrium, and that this equilibrium is Pareto 
dominant. If this equilibrium is not (a, /3) then it could be argued that the 
agents will deviate to it since it yields them higher payoffs.
Imposing the restriction that the equilibrium played not be strictly 
Pareto dominated by another equilibrium may therefore restrict the set 
of feasible actions. Ma (1988) shows that allowing players to send mes­
sages to the principal allows any action pair to be implemented uniquely 
at no extra cost in the model of Mookherjee (1984). A similar problem 
arises in the model of Demski and Sappington (1984) mentioned in the 
introduction and Ma, Moore and Turnbull (1988) propose a mechanism to 
eliminate it. Nevertheless, these mechanisms have some unappealing fea­
tures (for example Ma’s mechanism relies on having an unbounded message 
space12) and we do not consider them here. The simple mechanisms of the 
form considered here seem more natural and intuitive than those produced 
by message exchange.13
8If Assumptions 4 and 5 hold.
9A proof of this can be found in the Appendix.
10This follows from Theorem 7 of Milgrom and Roberts (1990).
"See Theorems 5 and 7
12In the context of Ma, Moore and Turnbull (1988), Mookherjee and Reichelstein (1990) 
show that one can use finite mechanisms if one only requires that the desired equilibrium 
be the unique pure strategy equilibrium of the game, so it may be possible to apply these 
results to Ma’s model. Nevertheless, it is not clear why mixed strategy equilibria should 
be ignored.
"Moore (1992) is an excellent survey on implementation and discusses the extent to 




























































































The situation with regard to uniqueness is somewhat different with se­
quential moves. The first agent can choose whichever point on agent 2’s 
reaction function is optimal for him and so there can be no point which 
strictly Pareto dominates the equilibrium point for both players. If an 
action pair can be implemented, the requirement that the equilibrium ac­
tion pair not be strictly Pareto dominated by another action pair therefore 
imposes no extra restriction.
Since imposing the restriction that an equilibrium not be strictly Pareto- 
dominated by another equilibrium reduces the set of implementable out­
comes under simultaneous moves but does not affect the set of outcomes 
under sequential moves, it follows that Proposition 1 remains valid with 
this stricter interpretation of implementability. Furthermore the case for 
sequential moves is strengthened, since one can write down examples in 
which an action pair can be implemented with sequential moves but is al­
ways strictly Pareto-dominated by another equilibrium with simultaneous 
moves. On the other hand, the example in the previous sub-section shows 
that an action pair may be the Pareto dominant equilibrium with simul­
taneous moves but unimplementable with sequential moves, so moving to 
sequential moves may still be worse even when one takes into account the 
problem of multiple equilibria.
4.3 Other Remarks
If an action pair can be implemented with agents moving in either order, 
which is not always the case, one might ask what determines the optimal 
move order. In general, this question is hard to answer since it depends 
upon the agents’ utility functions and reservation price level as well as 
the probability functions. It also depends on the precise action pair to 
be implemented. Intuitively, one should put the agent whose action is 
most sensitive to the other agent’s action moving second, since then the 
monitoring value is greatest, but one also needs to consider which agent’s 





























































































This paper has demonstrated the importance of taking into account the 
precise move structure when studying problems with multiple agents. In 
particular, we showed that under reasonable conditions the principal would 
prefer to have agents choosing their actions sequentially rather than simul­
taneously if their actions are strategic complements.
A natural generalisation would be to allow more than two agents by 
having both more levels in the “hierarchy” and more than one agent in each 
level. This would be straightforward, although our sufficient conditions 
would become rather more cumbersome.
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